[146 cont.]

175 721 Ishim in 1635, and that Djangir, then the commander of the Kirghiz-Kazak army, was taken prisoner. When he had regained his liberty by chance, he wished to avenge himself against the Dzungars, and tormented them constantly by his raids. In order to force peace over a long period, or if possible to completely exterminate such dangerous neighbors, Bagatyr assembled an army of 50,000 men, made up of an equal number of his own men and those of his allies.

175 724 At the head of his forces he easily subdued two descent lines of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, 10,000 persons altogether. He would have continued to destroy all those whom Djangir set in opposition to him if this Kirghiz [-Kazak] sultan, a gifted warrior as one can see, had not used the most salutary measures in defending himself. He had only 600 armed men, and not daring 175 to attack the enemy openly with this handful of men, he placed 723 half of his group in a gorge between two mountains, causing them to be surrounded by a deep ditch and with a raised entrenchment. Then he himself lay in wait with the other half on the other side of the mountain. The Dzungars arrived in front of the entrenchment and attacked it. While they were losing many men in this struggle, in which they were at a disadvantage because of the narrow expanse of the terrain, Djangir fell upon them from the rear. This unexpected attack, the daring of the men he had chosen for this purpose, and the excellence of the guns with which they were all [147] armed, inflicted great losses upon Bagatyr. At this moment Alantush, the Tatar prince, arrived to support the Kirghiz [-Kazaks] at the head of 20,000 fresh troops and completed Bagatyr's ruin. The Dzungars were forced to withdraw and to limit their vengeance to taking away the prisoners they had taken during the battle. The Kazaks continued to harass them with frequent raids, not only during Bagatyr's time, but also under his successors.

175 648 We found the third reference to Ishim in the papers of Tevkelev, former interpreter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later major general. He spent two years among the

726

726 WARFARE--wartime mobilization; departure of troops (e.g., public ceremonies, rituals for securing supernatural aid, exhortations to bravery); military expeditions (e.g., marching, scouts, protection of flanks and rear, camping, mounting of guards, foraging, billeting); types of combat (e.g., skirmishes, surprise attacks, assaults, pitched battles, siege operations); joining battle (e.g., choice of time and place, ritual preliminaries and precautions); deploying and coordination of forces; special characteristics of naval and air combat; military conventions and rules of war (e.g., flag of truce); personal encounters (e.g., duels between champions); termination of combat (e.g., after first casualty, after desperate last stand); tactical withdrawals; flight and pursuit; surrender; etc. See also:

Religious practices 78
War songs 533
International law 648
Organization of army or war party 701

[146 cont.]

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[150 cont.]
175 replied by [151] promising to be obedient to Russia in all things.
643 These relations had no sequel, however, for Prince Gagarin was
[662] recalled to Moscow shortly after, and Tiavka, the oldest and most cautious of the khans, died. His companions did not know enough to profit from this favorable situation. Instead of joining together again to ask Russia's protection against the Dzungars, they
[578] began to quarrel among themselves, and without any thought of the general welfare they continued in their usual calling, that is, they pillaged all their neighbors. And Russia, who had offered them help and protection, was not the last to suffer from
[726] this. Not content with their frequent raids across the borders of Siberia, in that same year, 1719, they moved in as far as Novo-Sheshminsk (in the Kazan guberniya), took the city, and laid it waste, and although they were driven out with great losses, they
[727] took away a large number of prisoners. This last expedition was made by the subjects of Khan Abulkhair (1). Kaip was afraid

1. See Rychkov's History of Orenburg /Istoriia Orenburgskaia/ and governor
[643] Nepluev's reports to the senate. Rychkov does not say who commanded the Kazaks in this expedition, but Nepluev says that it was Khan Abulkhair, who later became a subject of the Russian empire.

that it might be attributed to him and that he might be punished, although innocent, for the crime of his rival, so he sent a letter
[728] in 1718 to Peter I, in which he offered perpetual peace and alliance (2).

2. This letter, as well as the reply made to it by the governor of Kazan, is still preserved today /1832/ in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

175 This letter, however, did not stop the just vengeance of
721 the dwellers along the border, who were annoyed by the constant
726

[151 cont.]
175 raids of the Kazaks. The Volga Kalmuks, the Bashkirs, and
721 the Siberian Cossacks began to attack again with more strength
726 than ever. Galdan Tsyren could not watch the ruin of the old enemies of his people with composure, nor leave unavenged the aggressions and wrongs which his ancestors had been obliged to endure for more than a century. After having delivered several terrible blows against them, he [152] seized Turkestan, the capital of their khans, in 1723 (1), in addition to Tashkent and Sairam,

1. Nepluev and Rychkov, in their reports written from Orenburg to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often say that Abulkhair lived in Turkestan until 1723, at which time he was driven out by the Dzungars.

and finally he brought several branches of the Great Horde and the Middle Horde completely under his rule.

[722] A similar fate awaited all the other Kirghiz-Kaisaks [Kazaks], who were pressed and pursued from all sides, and they might have been completely exterminated if they had not retreated to the south. The remnants of the Great Horde and a small part of the Middle Horde fell back toward Khodzhent /Leninabad/, most
175 of the Middle Horde retreated to Samarkand, and the Little Horde
167 moved to Khiva and the realm of Bukhara (2). These migrations
731

2. This is what the famous elder of the Middle Horde, Bukenbai, said to Tevkelev when they met in Orsk in 1748, and he added: "At that time we fled before the Kalmuks, the Siberian and the Yaik /Ural/ Cossacks, and the Bashkirs like hares before the hounds."

brought inevitable ruin and disaster in their wake. The herds and the studs dwindled from one day to the next, and misfortune and misery befell everyone, some died of hunger, and others abandoned

[152 cont.]

175 their wives and children. Finally, the fugutives halted, but in
[167 barren localities offering no support to a nomadic people. It
731] was impossible for the Kazaks to endure such an unhappy situation for long. Of the two scourges which menaced them, it was best to choose the one which promised some advantages, if not for the present at least for the future. Despair drove them to make themselves masters of their old territories, which they could not do without. Danger had snuffed out the flame of dissension and replaced it with unanimity of sentiment, and the efforts of all
[44] were directed to the same end. It was decided in a general assembly of the people to advance, attack the common enemies, and drive them from the lands of the Kazaks. This undertaking was sanctified at once by a common oath to remain faithful to
[643 each other. Khan Abulkhair was chosen as [153] leader of the
782] nation, and the sacrifice of a white horse (1), which was made

1. See the article on "Customs" in the statistical section of this book, for more details. [Not translated.]

according to the custom of this people, was considered a pledge of future peace.

●[726] After these preparations the Kazaks advanced, attacked the Dzungas, and won a number of battles against them, and re-
[727] covered their old lands. But as they expected new attacks from Galdan Tsyren, they found it more opportune to move away from this dangerous neighbor, and some retreated to the north, while others moved westward. Only the Great Horde remained near the Dzungars, and they submitted to the latter almost in entirety, as we shall soon see. The Little Horde did not stop at the Emba
175 River, which was formerly the border, when they arrived there,
166 but crossed over to the right bank and attacked the Volga
726 Kalmuks, and after seizing a large part of their pasture lands, they moved all the way to the Ural River. The Middle Horde moved north to the Ori and the Ui, and drove out many Bashkirs from the vicinity of these rivers. Although the strength of the

[153 cont.]
175
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latter, like that of the Volga Kalmuks, did not compare with the power of the Dzungars, nevertheless the lands which the Kazaks had seized belonged to them, and consequently they wished to give no peace to the people who had taken the lands from them. Expeditions for revenge and constant raids were planned for the future and began from this moment. The Cossacks of the Ural, new neighbors of the Kazaks, promised to do the same. It was necessary to seek a defender against so many enemies; it was necessary to ask help from Russia. Perhaps this thought had often come to the minds of the sultans and the wisest elders, but it was difficult not only to put it into execution, but also to propose it to the people. Although we find in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a detailed account of the articles proposed orally in 1726 by Kaibakar, deputy of the Kazaks, who [154] came to ask the protection of Russia for the Little Horde, in the name of the elders Sugur, Iedikbai, Khadjibai, Tiak-Kulybai, and others, nevertheless this communication had no decisive sequel. Judging by the names of the elders who sent Kaibakar, one is forced to think that they were too weak and inconspicuous to win the people over to them, and their mission remained unsuccessful. It is not known what suddenly led them to take this step, but one can be sure that most of the Kazaks were displeased by it. They preferred their barbarous freedom to any kind of order and to dependence upon laws, nor had they forgotten that the tenets of their religion commanded them to regard the Russians as infidels.

These two obstacles seemed to make the free union of the Kazak hordes with a Christian empire impossible. But unfortunate circumstances, endless dissensions, bloodshed, and the clever mind of Khan Abulkhair changed the inclinations of the people to the point where, after a feeble resistance, he decided to carry out a measure, based on the individual views of a single man, to which he could not have been moved by love of the public weal. I speak here of the voluntary submission of the Kazaks to Empress Anna, an event which took place in 1730, as we shall see below.

Before coming to the description of this revolution, which is so important, we should note here that it forms the line of

[158 cont.]
×648 could not destroy their love nor habit of freedom.

When they realized that it was impossible for them to keep their old regions on Lake Balkash, they drew back to the Tsuya
●[726] and Sara-Su [Sary-Su?] rivers. Later when they united their forces, they attacked Tashkent and Turkestan and laid them waste, as well as many other cities and villages belonging to those two states, and they acquired so much power over the residents of Tashkent that they forced them to choose their khans from the horde.

Shubai, Arslanov, and Mansur, residents of the former province of Vyatka, came from Tashkent to Orenburg in 1742 (1)

1. See the file for 1742 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

and told how the khan named above ruled in Tashkent until 1739, and that a powerful old Kazak named Tiul Biu shared his authority,
[651] and every year they levied a tribute on the city. Later Djulbars was killed, but Tiul Biu continued to rule after him for a time and to levy tribute. A certain Kussiak Bek, a tributary subject of Galdan Tsyren, and perhaps his lieutenant, put an end to the power of Tiul Biu.

He was the ruler of Tashkent while Shubai and Mansur were there, but the Dzungarian sovereign received the tribute he took from the people. According to our travelers, under Kussiak Bek the Kazaks had no more influence over Tashkent, but they re-
[726] strained the environs of this city to such a degree that it was as though under a state of permanent siege. They cultivated land under its walls, seized the neighboring forests, and at the slightest dissatisfaction they seized the residents of the city and the merchants who came to trade with them.

×648 Turkestan too was for a certain time in a [159] similar
721 position, although the Kazaks did not hinder the Dzungars from
[439] trading there. As for the small towns between Tashkent and Turkestan, the Kazaks who conquered them during this period kept them until the beginning of the present [19th] century.

[159 cont.]

x 648 721 We are obliged to note with surprise, however, that in spite of these conquests and hostilities of a people subject to Galdan Tsyren, the Great Horde never dared to go and attack the Dzungars, nor even to call themselves independent of them.

x 648 662 Some years later, in 1749, Tiul Biu, who had been driven out of Tashkent by Kusiak [sic] Bek and was dissatisfied by his insignificance, wished to elevate himself through the protection of Russia, and he sent deputies to Orenburg to propose that he become a Russian subject (1). His weakness was no doubt known

1. Tevkelev mentions this in one of his journals.

to the Russian government, and his proposal also had no effect.

[152] The terror with which the Dzungars filled the Kazaks and the apparent submission of the latter lasted until internal dissensions began to weaken the Dzungars and until these dissensions finally led to the complete dispersal of this people, as is known. The disagreement had scarcely begun to be noticeable when the Kazaks took the most active part in it. They offered asylum to all the exiled Dzungarian princes and zaisangs, and joined with

● [726] them to avenge their wrongs. They attacked their enemies, and on the pretext of helping the unfortunate, they never let the opportunity pass of weakening their old enemies by raids. Finally, when the Chinese wished to interfere in the dissensions of the Dzungars, and the success of their arms had reduced Galdan Tsyren's successors to a state of utter weakness, then the Kazaks of the Great Horde took Amursan's (2) side and formed a part of

2. This prince was the last Dzungarian sovereign. At first he was a subject of China, then her enemy, and he died in Russia.

the army which opposed the invaders [160] until 1756, the time when the Dzungarian empire, which had been so powerful ten years earlier, fell under the blows of the Chinese. The people who had

[160 cont.]

comprised this empire were exterminated or dispersed, and the lands they had occupied remained deserted.

This event brought about two great advantages for the Kazaks. It delivered them from enemies who were as restless as they were dangerous, and it gave them the means of extending their pasture lands over excellent places.

The Bogdo Khan /emperor/ of China was far from being opposed to their occupying the ravaged steppes of Dzungaria, and indeed he tried to attract them there. To halt raids, he established a fortified line between them and their old lands, which is still called the New Line today.

Thus the Kazak Great Horde, which had been constricted for so long, expanded on all sides to turn the best pasture lands to account. The part of this horde which came closest to the Chinese frontier and mixed with some of the remnants of the Dzungars was punished several times by force of arms for its usual brigandage, and it became subject to China and remains among Chinese subjects to this day. The others, who nomadize a little further west, have retained their independence.

Some fractions of these two groups live next to the Buruts, and having often had to fight against them, have become more warlike and dangerous than all the other Kirghiz-Kazaks. We could not enumerate all their continual battles with their neighbors here, but we cannot help mentioning the violent attack they made in 1771 against the Kalmuk Torguts, who were fleeing from Russia under the command of the famous Ubashi.

The man who distinguished himself most in this event was Erali, sultan of the Great Horde, who was known in China for his bravery and who received the title of knight or paladin of the court from the Bogdo Khan (1). When he had learned of the

1. We have taken this information [161] on the exploits of this sultan from the Chinese work by Prince Tsichi [Chi Shih?], which is about the flight of the Torguts and was translated into Russian by Lipovtsov.

[160 cont.]
approach of the [161] Torguts to his lands and of the misfortunes they had had to endure in the Middle Horde, he prepared at once to fight them once more and with the utmost severity. He called upon Sultan Ablai to attack them from the rear and his weaker allies to make a flank assault, while he himself marched to meet the enemy at the head of his elite troops, taking the precaution of sending his family, as well as the women, children, and old people, and their most precious possessions, to places sheltered from danger. These first plans were very well conceived but were not as fully successful as was expected, for Ablai refused to participate in carrying them out. Erali (1) remained alone, and

1. Prince Tsichi calls this sultan Erelinasali. This name is not Kazak and was no doubt erroneously composed from two names or was distorted by the Chinese.

since he was much weaker than the Torguts, he could not attack them openly. But his presence of mind and military strategems took the place of the assistance he lacked. He disclosed his intention of halting the fugitives and not allowing them to pass through.

Ubashi and his subjects, who had already suffered so many mishaps during their journey, were struck with terror by this hostile move of the Kazaks, and instead of overthrowing their enemy at once, they halted before him and began to take counsel and to reflect, and spent 18 days in complete inactivity. Erali was able to profit from their indecision. While the Kalmuks busied themselves with fruitless deliberations, he gathered around him auxiliaries and allies from all sides to defend himself. Sometimes he indicated the injustice done them by the closeness of the Kalmuks, or else he dazzled them with hopes of the rich booty which would be the reward of victory over a people moving from one land to another with all its wealth and a large number of women.

[162] Ubashi, who saw the forces of his enemies constantly increasing, completely lost his courage and instead of fighting

[162 cont.]
726 preferred to humbly ask permission to pass beyond toward the Ili River. Erali pretended to consent but had the intention of striking
[662] a most terrible blow against the fleeing prince after having lulled him into security to some extent. And this is exactly what happened. Scarcely had the Kalmuks moved away from the Kazaks and set up their camp to spend the night when Erali and his allies attacked them abruptly, annihilated whole groups which had gone
[727] to sleep without taking precautions, and took an immense booty of prisoners, various objects, and livestock. The third part of the Great Horde, which had camped in the neighborhood of Tashkent from the time of Galdan Tsyren, did not move after the annihilation of the Dzungars but began to establish itself on the spot in the localities it occupied, and persecuted the neighboring cities and villages more strongly. Tashkent was the city which suffered most. Raids, the pillage of caravans, and the almost complete loss of arable lands brought about the absolute ruin of its inhabitants. Although they were not subjects of the Kazaks, they were dependent upon them for everything and were obliged to purchase all the necessities of life and trade from them at a high price.

In 1760 a large number of Karakalpaks [Kara-Kalpak] joined this part of the Great Horde. These Karakalpaks lived at the mouth of the Syr [Darya] River, but being hemmed in by the Little Horde, especially under Khan Nurali, they had retreated further east. It is not known why the Kazaks, who were so powerful, did not seize Tashkent completely and establish themselves there. But there is no doubt that this city has had to suffer from their aggressions until our day. The khans of this country, being weak and unenterprising, have tried to avert these raids by favors, gifts, and concessions more than by resistance and
[829] vigorous measures. The Kazaks are accustomed to viewing indulgence as [163] a sign of weakness, and consequently this kind of behavior, far from disarming them, leads them to renewed violence.

Tashkent proved the truth of this by its own experience some time later when Iunus Khodja became ruler of this city.

[163 cont.]
x 648 726 He soon saw that the behavior of his predecessors toward the Kazaks had produced general misfortune, and that until this people was brought to reason by force of arms it would not stop tormenting his subjects. He acted in accordance with this political fact and assembled an army with which he attacked the Great Horde in 1798 (1). Luck was with him and he won great victories

1. See the unpublished journal of Pospelov, who was in Tashkent in 1800.

over the oppressors in the first battles. Encouraged by these fortunate beginnings, he continued to pursue them and added to the force of arms punishments which could only be conceived by the imagination of an exasperated Asiatic. He had the prisoners de- [727] capitated and formed pyramids of these heads in the sight of the enemy army. These frightful sights struck the hearts of the Kazaks with inexpressible terror. Lacking true courage and being accustomed to fighting only for pillage, they could not unanimously [721 828] resolve to die to avenge the blood of their brothers. They dreaded slavery, and this fear obliged them to submit to Iunus Khodja.

x 648 Having thus proved the superiority of severity and decision, this prince seized from the Kazaks all the villages which were in [727] their power and not only demanded complete submission in the future but also reparations, according to Asiatic custom, for the pillage and murder done against the residents of Tashkent. Finally [651] he prescribed rules for their litigations and made them pay a tribute of one sheep out of every hundred. In a word, he reduced them completely to the state of subjects, and later he put them in his armies like his own subjects.

We repeat, however, that he did not subjugate the entire [164] Great Horde, for many Kazaks, even among those neighbor- [166] ing him, escaped his power. Several thousand tents retreated to the Irtysh River and joined the Middle Horde, while others gained the Ak-Tau Mountains with their troops, and still others various other places.

The Kazaks who had become subjects of Iunus Khan remained under the domination of Tashkent as long as this city, with the lands which belonged to it, including Turkestan, did not fall under

[183 cont.]
[648] we know that in 1736, in addition to the fortress of Orenburg, he had founded the forts of Guberlinsk and Ozernaya on the Yaik, which still exist today, and three fortified ports, Sredny, Berdskoy, and Krylov. We do not speak here of the forts erected on the Samara River and in the interior of the country of the Bashkirs since they have no connection with our subject.

The arrival of Russian troops at the Ural River could not help but influence the peace of the Kazak hordes, even if only momentarily. But this did not prevent them from harassing Russian subjects in the west.

Although Kirilov had not succeeded in seeing the Kazak princes and consequently could not carry out the order he had received to prepare their hordes to attack the Volga Kalmuks who were revolting, the Kazaks had no need of being urged to an act
x 648 toward which they were naturally inclined.

Scarcely had they heard of the disturbances on the Volga,
● 726 when they hastened off to pillage the Kalmuks (2). The successful

2. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of February 9, 1737, under the name of Kirilov, and the copies of reports of Prince Repnin and Beklemishev which are appended to it.

outcome of this campaign and the seizure of many prisoners and some livestock in 1736 was not enough to satisfy the greed of the Kazaks, and they repeated their attacks in 1737, returning home with considerable booty.

x 648 Kirilov was charged (3) with making Abulkhair realize how

3. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 8, 1737.

much the ravages which his subjects were inflicting upon those of the empire [184] were contrary to the views of the government, and ordered to take measures to prevent them from committing similar acts in the future. This admonishment did not achieve

[185 cont.]

×648 was never sent and still remains today in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg (1).

1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of December 30, 1737.

×648 669 The Bashkir revolt had still not been put down. Abulkhair was afraid to take any part in this revolt, and he himself suggested to Tatishchev that he help to subdue the rebels. The higher authority was informed of this proposal and gave permission for it to be accepted (2), authorizing the Khan to enter the land of the

2. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 22, 1738.

Bashkirs, provided however that in acting against the rebels he would leave in peace those who remained loyal and would defend their persons and properties if necessary. In defiance of this order, ×648 ● 726 Abulkhair pillaged the lands of the Bashkirs for two consecutive months without distinguishing between rebels and loyal subjects, and the results proved that he had no other end in proposing his [663] services but to gorge himself and his Kazaks on booty. It is even asserted that he intended to make his son khan of the Bashkirs, ×648 726 727 and when he entered the lands of this people, he announced himself their protector and defender before the Russian government, but when he saw that his deceit was a failure he began the pillage. As a consequence it was commanded that he be made to depart from the lands of the Bashkirs as soon as possible. Tatishchev carried out this order with gentle means and without wrangling.

The son of Abulkhair Khan, Erali, remained in Orenburg as hostage, however.

While Abulkhair was carrying out his ravages against the Bashkirs, part of his horde, which was camping at the mouth of the Ural, renewed its attacks against the Kalmuks and took many Russians prisoners during one of the raids (3). Fearing the just

3. See the reports sent from Astrakhan,

[185 cont.]

and the ukase of February 6, 1738 addressed to Tatishchev, in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

punishment for their misdeeds, Abulkhair and his partisans were terrified to hear that Tatishchev was approaching from Orenburg with troops in the month of July, 1738. They believed that this army, which according to [186] rumor had been joined by several thousand Kalmuks, was coming to punish them, whereas Tatishchev, who was being escorted by the army, had no other purpose but to open meetings with the Khan and the principal Kazak sultans.

Wishing to assure themselves of his intentions, they sent Batyr Bukenbai, of whom we have already spoken and who was universally respected, to meet Tatishchev. The ostensible reason for his mission was to discover at what time Abulkhair should come to Orenburg and the number of sultans who should accompany him. The true reason was to reconnoiter the strength of the army and to find out if there were Kalmuks.

In spite of the fact that Bukenbai had calmed his compatriots on this subject, Abulkhair, who was conscious of his crimes, took a long time to decide to go to Orenburg. He finally arrived, and halted with his entire suite below the walls of the fortress, but he was afraid to surrender himself before Tatishchev, making the excuse that it was not befitting the person of a sovereign to make the first visit to a general. He held to this idea primarily because of the arguments of the elders who accompanied him. However Tevkelev, as his coreligionist and an old acquaintance, reassured him and made him decide to renounce his proud claim. The assurance that he was surrendering himself to the imperial camp and not to the State Councilor Tatishchev made him reduce his pretentions and go to Orenburg, which was then no more than an armed camp.

The interview was scheduled for the month of August, 1738.

In order to give it greater pomp, and thus to strike the fancy of the Asiatics, who love pageantry in all things, a major

[193 cont.]
of 1741 gave reason to doubt the sincerity of their demonstrations and promises. We said above that Karasakal, chief of the Bashkir [167] rebels, had retreated to the Kazak hordes. It is not known which khan or sultan took him under protection, but it is recognized that having announced himself to be the brother of Galdan Tsyren, the general of the Dzungars, he went out and laid waste the settle- [726] ments of the latter people at the head of a large number of armed Kazaks. Galdan had been warned of this attack and sent to punish these brigands an army of 15,000 men, who pursued them [727] almost to Orenburg across the Kazak steppe and devastated the auls in their path, killing or taking away men and livestock. The subjects of Abul Mahmet and Ablai suffered most from this situation, which causes one to suppose that they had supported Karasakal and aided him, and that this had brought down all these misfortunes upon them. The swift advance of the Dzungars was stopped by the commander of Orenburg, who saw them approaching the border and sent word to them that they were violating the peace which existed between Russia and Galdan Tsyren. The head of the Dzungarian army withdrew at once, after declaring that neither he nor his master had been informed of the submission of the Kazaks to Russia, and that these peoples had made all their neighbors lose patience with them because of their constant brigandage. They were told that in future they should address their [194] complaints about the Middle and the Little Hordes to the Russian government and not take justice into their own hands. It can be imagined that neither Galdan nor his general could understand the justice of this diplomatic solution, and that they continued to act toward the new Russian subjects as they had during their independence.

This event made Abul Mahmet request the Russian government to erect a fortified city in the midst of the grazing lands of the Middle Horde. He knew that a similar promise had been made to Abulkhair, and he considered himself worthy of being treated on the same footing.

[726] Although the Kazaks had been given a strong lesson by the Dzungars, a still more terrible storm menaced them from the

X648 [726] [194 cont.]
southwest. Shah Nadyr, the terror of Asia, was nearing Khiva, and once he had conquered it he could easily attack the Kazak hordes. The cabinet in St. Petersburg had already taken measures to fortify the new border along the Ural as much as possible. But this precaution was useless, for Nadyr passed around the Kazak steppes without paying any attention to it. He could not help but know that the conquest of a nomadic people is difficult in general, and that the booty which can be gained from it is practically nothing. Thus it is not surprising that he left the Kazaks in peace.

Abulkhair had seized Khiva in 1741 and was there when the Persian armies entered this country. At that time with him was Muravin, a geodetic officer who, as we said above, had been ordered in 1740 to explore the site on the Syr /Darya/ where Abulkhair had requested that a city be built. Relying upon this officer more than upon his sultans, Abulkhair sent him as his representative to meet the Shah to pay him his respects and to beg the latter to allow him to remain khan of Khiva. Nadyr received Muravin most graciously, gave him gifts in silver and clothing, and sent him back, directing him to tell Abulkhair to present himself in the Persian camp, where he would be received and rewarded as a subject of the [195] Empress of Russia, with whom the Shah wished to maintain peace and good terms (1).

[727]

1. As proof of his sincerity we cite the following fact: Zhanaiev, a Russian Tatar, brought to Samara ten Russian slaves who had been prisoners in Khiva. Nadyr freed them and gave each one 50 rubles and a horse to return home.

X648 726 Whether from fear, or from lack of faith in Nadyr's words, or because of a conspiracy plotted by the Khivans, Abulkhair refused to appear before the Persian conqueror and withdrew within his horde. After his departure the Khivans decided to resist the Persian army and shut themselves up in the city. Nadyr took it by assault in three days (2) and gave the people of Khiva one of

2. See in the archives of the Orenburg

[195 cont.]

x 648
●[726]

Border Commission the reports of the Tatar Zhanaiev, already mentioned, who himself was in Khiva during the siege.

[669] his generals as khan. But this new prince had few troops at his disposal, and the Khivans were not slow in getting rid of him.

Nurali, son of Abulkhair, was chosen to replace this chief, who had done nothing more than appear, but his reign was no longer than that of his predecessor. When he learned that Nadyr was angered at the revolt of the Khivans and was preparing an army to punish them, he hastened to leave Khiva and to rejoin his father within the pasture lands of the Kazak Little Horde.

[726] He had not yet found security, however. Galdan Tsyren had grown impatient with the raids the Kazaks made while he had been engaged in war with China, and having finished his most important affairs, he again sent two bodies of troops, one of which attacked the Little Horde and the other the Middle Horde. Abulkhair appealed at once to the Russian government, requesting help. In order to respond to the Khan's wishes, the Imperial Cabinet gave orders that in case of danger he should be allowed to enter the fortress of Orenburg with his family and servants.

This permission was a kindness to Abulkhair, but it did not protect him from the attacks which the Dzungars might make later. Since he lived most of the time in the midst of the steppes or near the Syr /Darya/, [196] it was not always easy for him to seek refuge in Orenburg, which was too far away; the Dzungars could always cut him off from it by occupying the northern part of the Kazak steppes. In the west the Dzungars would have been aided by the Kalmuks, who belonged to the same race. It was still more dangerous for Abul Mahmet and Ablai. In many localities their subjects were the closest neighbors of the Dzungars and often themselves lived as nomads closer to the lands of the latter than to Orenburg.

When the danger was proven by the abduction of Ablai, the

[201 cont.]

×648 622 [152] Meanwhile Abulkhair concealed his resentment and never ceased to give assurances to everyone of his devotion to Russia, asserting that all these attacks had been made by Kazaks who were disobeying him. He even went so far as to advise that they be penalized and punished by death (2).

2. See the letter of July, 1743 from Khan Abulkhair to Nepluev.

But when the troops were reinforced along the Russian border, and the Bashkirs profited by the absence of the Kazaks [727] to attack their auls and began to carry off their studs, Abulkhair thought seriously of halting the raids. But this was no longer in his power to do. His people, greedy for plunder, wished to be at peace only when they were alarmed by the advance of Russian troops across the Ural to go into the steppes to punish the [41] brigands. This was only a rumor, spread on purpose, no doubt, by the prudent head of the Orenburg region. Yet this was not where the true intentions of the Russian government lay. It did not wish to lose the regular army in pursuing nomad brigands in the desert wastes, but found it more advantageous to punish them through another people, as restless and as unfaithful as the Kazaks themselves. In a word, the government wished to arm the Kalmuks against them. In the meantime, Nepluev was ordered (3) to [202] try to seize Kazaks of the leading families

3. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 31, 1743.

as hostages. Either as a consequence of this order or for some other reason, Abulkhair suddenly delivered a considerable number of Russian subjects who had been taken prisoner by his horde during the most recent raids, and promised to return the others soon.

[726] The year 1744 not only failed to bring peace along the Russian border, but even increased the dangers of those who lived there, for Khan Abulkhair removed his mask and took an open part in the hostilities of his people. His more daring subjects continued

[202 cont.]
their attacks on the borders while he, fearing to come near the Ural River, found a way in the heart of his deserts to avenge himself upon the Russians who had retained his son. First he robbed a caravan going from Astrakhan to Khiva, which had the misfortune to pass through his lands. Later he stopped the journey of Lieutenant Gladyshev, who was going from Orenburg to the Karakalpaks. Nor was he satisfied with robbing the Karakalpak envoys who had come from St. Petersburg and were accompanying Gladyshev, but he even seized the imperial letter which was entrusted to them (1).

1. It is worthy of note that in his journal Gladyshev speaks of having found an English merchant named Djake [Jack?] with the Little Horde in 1742, and that he bought various articles from him in order to present them to the Karakalpaks as gifts.

This conduct strengthened the Russian government in their intent to punish the Kazaks through the Volga Kalmuks, inasmuch as the quarrels of these two peoples and their raids upon each other had become more intense at this time. Consequently, on April 24, 1744, Dunduk Dash, deputy of the Kalmuk khanate was presented with a letter patent commanding him to collect as many armed Kalmuks as possible, who would receive powder and shot at Astrakhan, would march against the Kazaks, and would act under the orders of the governor of Orenburg, Nepluev. By way of recompense, the Kalmuks were promised all the plunder they could take from the Kazaks, except for elders and their children. This letter, out of precaution as much as through confidence in [203] Nepluev, was sent to him directly instead of to the horde, so that he could use it if it were indispensable. It is not known what he thought of such a decisive measure, but this letter remained at Orenburg, and the original is still preserved in the archives of the Border Commission.

[203 cont.]

[648] The order given in this letter was not carried out. On the contrary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave orders that the Kalmuks as well as the Kazaks were to be prevented from crossing the Ural to attack each other.

[726] It must be supposed that the government changed its mind because of the troubles which broke out at that time on the Siberian frontier. The Dzungarian kungtaidji suddenly advanced with his troops toward the Russian border, and his subjects began to threaten the garrisons with war, while the rumor spread that he wished to attack the establishments of Kolyvano-Voskresensk, where he was attracted by the mines of precious metals.

At this time the Dzungars were still formidable, and an attack by them could not be compared to the raids of the Kazaks. Therefore it was indispensable to prepare adequate forces against them. As a result the insolence of the Kazaks was forgotten, and Nepluev received an order (1) to persuade them to

1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 3, 1744.

make raids against the Dzungars.

It was a difficult task to carry out. Khan Abulkhair still [186] held resentment against Russia in spite of the indulgence granted for his crimes. Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, retreated toward Turkestan in order to avoid Abulkhair's intrigues, and thus practically put an end to his relations with the border authorities. Besides he had less need for the help of Russia than the protection of the kungtaidji of the Dzungars, who held his son as hostage. [662] Finally, Abul Mahmet sought to be khan at Turkestan, and this city recognized the authority of Galdan Tsyren.

[664] [204] Sultan Barak, who had sworn allegiance to Russia two years earlier, lived far from her border, and fearing the Dzungars more than the Russians, he, like Abul Mahmet, had given his son to Galdan Tsyren as hostage.

[662] The latter sought to attach the sultans and the common people of the Middle Horde to himself by every means. To attain

[206 cont.]
[648] him in the name of the Empress (1) to make Abulkhair refuse it,

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 21, 1745.

but the latter would not have paid any attention to his advice if other circumstances had not prevented him from acceding to the wishes of the Khivans. Nurali received a letter from the son of the Shah of Persia inviting him to come to him. This prince considered the khanate of Khiva his property, being the conqueror. Nurali was on the point of departing for Khiva when his wife, whom he had left in that city, sent word that the Persians were only inviting him there in order to put him to death (2). This news kept

2. Continuation of the history of Orenburg by Rychkov, events of 1745.

him back with his father.

[643] Meanwhile the leaders of the Middle Horde, who had had no relation with Russia for nearly two years, approached the Russian border and renewed their assurances of devotion to the Empress. Abul Mahmet left Turkestan to join his horde and sent a messenger to St. Petersburg to volunteer his services; later he renewed his oath of loyalty. Sultan Barak did likewise. He also sent an embassy to St. Petersburg.

[668] The Kazaks were not yet at peace when disturbances took place in the Volga Kalmuk horde. The rumor spread that a large section wished to leave Russia, on the invitation of Galdan Tsyren, to join their compatriots, the Dzungars. This rumor, which was confirmed in fact 26 years later, was false at this time, but it disturbed the government, especially when the news had been received from the Ural that a large number of Kalmuks had crossed over from the Russian bank to the Kazak side, and [207] when reports from Siberia stated that the Dzungarian
● [726 727] armies had reached the Irtysh /River/ in some places. Subsequent events showed that the passage of the Kalmuks across the Ural

[207 cont.]
River had no other end but to attack the Kazaks, from whom they took many horses at this time; meanwhile the Dzungarian army returned to its home in peace, and Galdan Tsyren, the leader, died (1746).

This retreat, which was soon followed by the destruction of the Dzungarian state, brought peace to the Siberian frontiers, but it did not cause the Volga Kalmuks to lose their desire to join their compatriots. In order to hinder this project as much as possible, and also to put an end to the pillaging between the Kalmuks and Kazaks, both peoples were strictly forbidden to cross the Ural /River/. Also a regiment of Russian troops was detailed to keep watch there and to show that in the future such infractions would not remain unpunished. The Kalmuk leaders who had taken part in the last raid against the Kazaks were treated as state criminals and punished in [sur] the Volga, in order to serve as an example to their compatriots.

It was hoped that these measures would restore peace between the two enemy hordes, but it was hoped in vain. It is possible that the strict prohibition to crossing the border and the punishment of several violators of this rule, by way of example, did have some effect upon the Kalmuks, but it did not stop the Kazaks, who had become accustomed for two or three years not only to pillaging the Kalmuks with impunity but also the Russians. The building of forts and fortified posts along the lower sectors of the Ural River could only hinder the raids against the Kalmuks but could not stop them. Careful observation indeed suggested to the Kazaks a way of surmounting this obstacle.

The northern part of the Caspian Sea freezes over during the winter, and during the great frosts not only may it be crossed by men and horses, but also the heaviest weights can be transported over the ice without any [208] danger. Profiting by this fact, in February, 1746 the Kazaks moved from their steppes to those of the Kalmuks across the ice, opposite the mouth of the Ural River, and they carried out such an impetuous and unexpected attack below Krasny Yar [Krasnoyarsk] against the Kalmuks that they carried off nearly 700 prisoners of both sexes, killed about

[208 cont.]
100 men, and led away an enormous number of livestock.

After this celebrated expedition, several small raids took place on the Russian border.

Khan Abulkhair was still the cause of these new plunderings. He continued to nurse a deep hatred of Nepluev and was angry because the government had not satisfied his complaints against the border authorities and had not given up his son Khodja Akhmet. For this reason he adopted the course of wreaking his vengeance against all the Russians. Not content with the wrong he had committed against Russia through the raids of his subjects, he took the advice of the latter and abused an interpreter whom Nepluev had sent to him with papers, did not let him out of sight, and detained him for about a year, tormenting him in different ways.

It was still too little. Abulkhair's fury was so blind that he sought to persuade his people to depart from Russia and go south into the sands and the waterless deserts. But the Kazaks knew the advantages of the lands neighboring Russia, and they openly refused to obey him in this case. His rage then fell upon those of his subjects who had opposed his plan to move, and he wrote to the border authorities to arrest these people when they entered fortified localities, as the fomenters of all the disturbances.

While he was thus delivering the innocent to punishment, he was preparing the true brigands for a new attack against the Volga Kalmuks and was only waiting for winter to send them off. In January, 1747, when the ice was strong enough on the Caspian Sea, they left their camps, successfully crossed [209] the ice opposite the mouth of the Ural River, and attacked the uluses of their enemies once again. But this time fortune betrayed them: the Kalmuks had been warned of the attack in time and retreated into the western part of their steppes. They were too far away, and it was too dangerous to pursue them; thus the bandits returned with empty hands. Then, to complete their misfortune, the ice began to melt, the passage across the ice became difficult, and they were obliged to cross the Ural River where the Yaik Cossacks, who had been sent against them, were waiting. The passage through the Russian troops was very costly, for when they had reached their shore, many dead were found there, and a greater number drowned in the river, for the ice had broken. Most of their horses fell into the hands of the Russians.

[210 cont.]
dispatched several trusted Kazaks to propose the marriage of his daughter to the Dzungarian sovereign.

As the Russian government, which was still unaware of this last step taken by Abulkhair, awaited the execution of his promises, it was informed that he had been assassinated.

These are the circumstances which preceded his death. When he returned from the fortress of Orsk to the auls, he assembled a band of armed Kazaks and moved at their head to pillage the unfortunate Karakalpaks, who had already suffered so much from him and his son. He met Sultan Barak, who had long hated him and who envied him the marks of distinction and the prerogatives which had been granted him by the Russian government. He held a grudge against Abulkhair particularly because the latter had pillaged the gifts he had been sent by the khan of Khiva. In addition, both claimed rights of sovereignty over the Karakalpaks who had established themselves in the Kazak horde. Both were violent and vindictive, and consequently their meeting could not take place without a quarrel.

Barak, who had more people with him, was the first to open combat. Abulkhair's band, which was less numerous, could not withstand the first encounter and took to flight, and the Khan, who was carried away by the fugitives, was obliged to follow their example. But Shigai [211] the sultan, son of Barak, overtook him and unhorsed him with a blow of his spear. Then Barak himself arrived and assuaged his bloody rage by killing his enemy with his own hands (1).

1. We have drawn this information from Tevkelev's journals, which are preserved in Orenburg in the archives of the Border Commission.

Although the Karakalpaks had suffered much from Abulkhair, his death only brought them a new blow instead of bringing them relief. For Barak, delivered from his rival, did not miss the chance to attack them and pillage them.

[211 cont.]

This act against a people considered subject to Russia and the assassination of a khan who was a vassal of the empire made Barak afraid to remain in the regions near the Russian borders, and for this reason he hastened to move away from the Aral Sea. Having taken the route toward Turkestan, he seized the towns of Ikan, Otrar, and Saganak and established his camps between these towns. He did not reside here long, however, for the following year (1749), on a visit to a khoja with his two sons, he was poisoned (2).

2. In the papers preserved in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg it can be seen that the Kazaks of the Little Horde who came to the Russian border then affirmed that Barak had been poisoned by order of the Dzungarian kungtaidji, who was blamed by Nurali for the assassination of his father.

The news of Abulkhair's death could not have caused an unpleasant impression in Russia. During the last years of his life, the conduct of this khan had been such that the [possibility of the] administration of the Little Horde by a new chief aroused greater hope than Abulkhair's death aroused compassion. The dignity of the empire demanded only that the Kazaks, as subjects, should request the Empress to confirm their new khan. It would have been dangerous and useless to annul the choice made according to the ancient customs of the nation and to designate another arbitrarily. But it seemed easy to cause the people to elect one of Abulkhair's sons. With this in mind Nepluev, after [212] consulting Tevkelev, sent to the horde an officer who was charged with contriving the means of making the choice of the people fall upon Sultan Nurali and if he was successful to convince him as well as the elders of the necessity of sending an embassy to Petersburg to request the confirmation of the Empress.

[221 cont.]
[643] ordered that these stipends were not to start being paid until he
[431] had returned all the Russian prisoners and the Volga Kalmuks, or at least most of them. It was supposed that this would be carried out soon, but it turned out completely otherwise, and Nurali did not receive his stipends until five years after they had been assigned to him.

[721] [222] At the beginning of 1750, Sultan Aichuvak, brother of the Khan, devised a plan, together with his father's friends, Batyr Djanibek, and a numerous band, composed partly of people of the Middle Horde but mostly made up of members of the Little Horde, to attack a people who lived near the Aral Sea and who were called the Aral people. These people were few in number and unaccustomed to war. One can easily guess that
[727] Aichuvak and his accomplices were successful in their enterprise and that they returned home with a large number of prisoners, studs of strange horses, and with many objects of different kinds which they had seized. But the Aral people were subjects of the khan of Khiva, who did not care to let the damage done to them
[644] pass without amends. Consequently he took into custody a large number of Nurali's subjects who had come to trade at the market in Khiva, and even his ambassador was arrested. There was no other way of releasing them than to return to the Aral people at least part of what they had lost, and especially the prisoners.

● [726] Shortly after this, Sultan Erali, following the example of his brother, attacked the Karakalpaks. But the troops which served as his army were too few, and in place of the booty he hoped for, he was taken prisoner and most of his companions were killed.

After having freed him, at the end of several months, Nurali arrived in Orenburg to see Nepluev and Tevkelev, but his journey did not have any important consequence.

[164] Intercourse between the Middle Horde and Russia rarely took place at that time. Their khan, Abul Mahmet, had retreated
[143] to Turkestan where he lived until his death without being heard from; and Barak, as we have said, had been imprisoned /poisoned/. The successors to their power had not yet made the

[229 cont.]

x248 K62 724

Sultan Ablai, who was as wise as he was enterprising, did not fail to profit from the quarrels of the Dzungarian princes, and he worked to prolong them, realizing the usefulness, both for his own security and that of the Kazaks on the outside, of weakening and parceling out their old enemies. To this end, he not only gave asylum to Amursan (2) and Lobacha (another

2. Amursan had broken away from China and wandered among the Kazak hordes. Later he sought refuge in Russia, where he died.

Dzungarian prince) in his village but went out to fight for them (3)

3. See the reports of Captain Iakovlev, who was then with the Middle Horde and who accompanied Ablai for some time as he followed Amursan and Lobacha in order to fight the Dzungars.

and helped them to destroy their own compatriots. When matters took a new turn, and the Chinese army won decisive victories over the Dzungars, Ablai joined the conquerors. But this change of allies did not cause him to change his goal, and he continued to exterminate his hateful neighbors as an ally of the Chinese, just as he had killed them when he was allied to the partisans of Amursan. But when Dzungaria had been completely vanquished, and the Chinese army, in order to complete its occupation, began to approach the Kazak steppes, Ablai came to meet them and acknowledged himself a vassal of the Emperor.

From this time on (1756) the vanity of the Chinese led them to include Ablai's pasture lands among their states, and he was immediately sent by Ch'ien Lung (4) a [230] letter patent

4. This is recorded by the Chinese who wrote the book Hsi Yu Wen Chien Lu, and we find an extract of it in Timkovskii, op. cit., I, p. 253.

[230 cont.]
of prince and a calendar [sic] in which the conditions were stated by which he was recognized as a vassal.

While Ablai and the weak sultans of the Middle Horde, who were his partisans, ravaged Dzungaria with their subjects, the Little Horde was fighting its coreligionists, the Bashkirs. An offense committed by the former produced such a hatred between the two peoples that it has not been entirely eliminated today. In order to describe this event better, we will present a picture of the condition of the Bashkir country at this time.

This people, which had been under Russian domination since the reign of Ivan the Terrible, had often raised the standard of revolt and had been punished for so doing. The misfortunes which caused the revolt of 1735 had scarcely ended in 1742. In spite of the difficult circumstances of this land, which for those seven years had had to mourn the loss and the sufferings of many of its inhabitants, the survivors did not remain quiet for long. On May 18, 1755 they revolted once more. Mutiny broke loose at once and began with the massacre of all the Russians to be found in the country, not only on the same day but almost at the same hour. This revolt was incited by the letters of a mullah named Batyr Shah, who reproached the Moslem faithful for obeying Christians and implored every believer in God and Mohammed to take arms, assuring them that those who died in this holy dispute would receive the eternal rewards promised by the Koran. Similar letters were also sent to the Kazan Tatars and the Kazak hordes. The latter took advantage of the occasion and began at once to make raids across the Russian borders under the pretext of supporting the Bashkirs.

The position of the Orenburg line then became extremely critical. It extended over a length of more than 1,000 versts; it was separated from the settlements in the interior and was surrounded by the Bashkirs in the north and [231] the Kazaks in the south. Most of the so-called fortresses and fortified posts had no fortifications at all. The garrisons were weak. In a word, at the slightest reverse all the residents along the border could perish, excepting those defending the fortress of Orenburg.

[231 cont.]
x 648 Fortunately this region was then governed by Nepluev. His
[643 presence of mind and his actions averted the storm which
722] menaced it. He immediately united the troops under his command at the points where defense was most necessary. He had reinforcements brought in from Kazan and also drew them from the Don Cossacks and from the khan of the Volga Kalmuks. While waiting, he armed the Meshcheriaks and Teptiars against the Bashkirs. He promised a complete pardon to those rebels who showed signs of repentance, and offered large pecuniary rewards for the heads of Batyr Shah and his principal accomplices. He sent declarations in the Tatar language to the Kazak hordes in the name of the akhun of Orenburg, in which this senior member of the Moslem clergy expressed his approbation of the Bashkir revolt but at the same time his fear that if they came to make themselves independent of Russia they might attack the Kazaks and finish by conquering them.

● [726] When the auxiliary troops had entered the land of the Bashkirs, the latter were not powerful enough to resist the Russians, Kalmuks, Teptiars, and Meshcheriaks together, and they fled across the Ural River with their wives and children, numbering more than 50,000 persons. A large number perished crossing the
[727 river, and the others concealed themselves within the hordes.
662] Those who remained in their settlements asked pardon, but their repentance was not sincere, and they were waiting for a new revolt. To avert this, and above all to prevent the Bashkirs from joining the Kazaks, Nepluev was obliged to take a cruel measure, but one which the times and circumstances made absolutely necessary.

x 648 He felt that it was necessary, for the security of the [232]
662 Orenburg line, to cause an irreconcilable hatred between the
661 Bashkirs and the Kazaks, for without this a reunion between them was always possible, and the inevitable result of such an alliance would be the ruin of all the Russian establishments on the Ural River. To achieve this end, he decided to place in the power of the Kazaks the wives and children of the Bashkirs who had left Russia to seek refuge among the Kazaks. Elizabeth's ministry had wished to protect the Russian border by a method more consistent with the views of kindness and humanity, but it was necessary to yield to

[232 cont.]
circumstances, and Nepluev, who had finally received the orders he had requested for the execution of his plan, at once informed the Khan, the Kazak sultans, and the most distinguished elders that as a reward for their faithfulness and devotion to Russia, the Empress was presenting them, as a gift, all the wives and daughters of the Bashkirs who were among them, on condition that the men be surrendered on the line, or at least driven out of the Kazak hordes. In addition, other rewards were promised for the extradition of the deserters.

The voluptuous Kazaks hastened to seize the women who were being abandoned to them. The Bashkirs wished to defend their families, but their number was toosmall and they could not resist. Some of them perished on the spot, others were surrendered to the Russians, and still others returned by themselves to their homes, waiting impatiently for the time to carry out their firm resolve to avenge this offense perpetrated by the Kazaks.

Rage and jealousy immediately aroused bands of avengers among the Bashkirs, who requested permission from the government to cross the Ural. Nepluev replied that the Empress did not grant permission to cross the border, but in secret he gave orders to the commanders of the forts and military posts to pay no attention to the people who crossed without permission into the steppes beyond the [233] Ural. Taking advantage of the pretended negligence of the guards, whole bands of Bashkirs crossed the Ural, fell upon the hordes, and began to pillage and massacre and to take away women and children.

Khan Nurali complained; he received the reply from Orenburg that the Kazaks had brought all these misfortunes upon their own heads by receiving the faithless deserters in their villages, and that all the Bashkirs were going to hasten to make similar exploits. Then Nurali's subjects took arms and began to repulse the attacks of their enemies, which the latter repeated constantly. The two people continued to destroy each other in this manner until Nepluev decided that it was fitting to call a halt to these disturbances. It was then strictly forbidden to the Bashkirs to cross the Ural, and it was suggested to the Kazaks that they retreat to

[234 cont.]
X 648 government took notice of it and gave orders, by way of reward (1),

1. By an ukase of August 25, 1755, the Khan was given a letter patent on this subject.

to begin to give Nurali the stipend which he had been assigned five years before and which had been withheld because he had not delivered the Russian prisoners. Later, as a favor, he was also granted permission to send kinsmen or the most distinguished of the sultans or elders to the court every two or three years. [431 661] These trips entailed, on the one hand, advantages and gifts to the Khan and his deputies, and on the other hand, they were useful to the government. During their stay at court, the envoys could serve as hostages, and as they became acquainted with the laws, customs, and habits of Russia during this sojourn, it was possible that they might become accustomed to it and spread information within the horde about the Europeans.

[721 726] The hatred and mutual hostility between the Bashkirs and the Kazaks saved many Russians from certain destruction by preventing their alliance. However this did not assure [235] peace on the border. The Bashkirs were burning with a desire for vengeance, and in spite of being forbidden to cross the Ural, they never ceased to raid the pastures of their enemies and to ruin them. Likewise the Kazaks never stopped pursuing and punishing these fiery enemies to the very center of their land. Once they had entered this region across the border, they fought the guards and pillaged the Russian settlements on their return, and these events were frequent. Although the Khan and sultans had good
Y 648 intentions, they could not calm their subjects. They frankly
578 admitted their lack of power and wrote that the common people even suspected them of maintaining secret liaisons with the Orenburg authorities in order to subject all the hordes to Russia (1).

1. Sultan Aichuvak in his zeal for Russia wrote to Nepluev as early as 1754 that the ordinary Kazaks suspected him and the

[240 cont.]
[648] not ceased their thieving and laid waste the border provinces as before. But the departure of the Kazaks would have been very [439] injurious in regard to trade, and it was to prevent this that Russia wished to keep her semisavage subjects in their old habitat.

[642 643] It was essential to keep Sultan Ablai well disposed toward Russia, for he was acquiring more influence over his subjects every day and was becoming more fitted than anyone else to drive them in some high undertaking. A large part of the Middle Horde had already given him the title of khan. He himself in his relations with the Russian authorities did not yet give himself more than the title of sultan. But his power and his rank as a Chinese prince, to which Ch'ien Lung had elevated him, made it easier for him to change his title and to adopt that of supreme chief of all the Middle Horde, without any permission or cooperation on the part of Russia. This manner of behavior would have been contrary to the dignity of the empire, for the Middle Horde was among its subjects. But it was impossible to prevent such an event by [241] prohibiting it, and it would have been too injurious to take revenge by force of arms. It was therefore decided to induce Ablai by kindness and favors to himself request his investiture with the title of khan in the name of his people. In anticipation of this request, he was assigned an annual stipend, and an officer was sent to him charged with subtly showing him the path by which he could acquire the position of khan and to inform him that in order to reach this goal it was necessary that he give his son as hostage, following the example of Nurali.

Against all expectations Ablai received the Russian envoy in a very unfriendly manner and refused to present his son. In addition, it was learned soon after from a reliable source that Abul Mahmet, who had been created the khan of the Middle Horde by Russia, was still alive, and therefore the elevation of a new khan was put off to another time.

[726] In 1760 the Kirghiz-Kazaks of the Middle Horde attacked the savage Kirgiz, or Buruts, and inflicted great losses upon them. [727] Later they caused a disturbance in a sector of the new conquests of China and took several prisoners there. The Chinese demanded

[241 cont.]
of Ablai that they be returned, and sent an army to support their demand (1). The appearance of this army threw terror into the

1. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

Middle Horde. They not only undertook to satisfy the desires of the Chinese government, but a large number of Bashkirs, Barabin Tatars, and Russian prisoners were surrendered on the Russian border.

Nevertheless Russia owed the return of these prisoners less to the terror inspired by the Chinese armies than to the efforts and power of Ablai, who, although he was a subject of two empires, sought for political reasons to prevent his people from making raids into Russia. In addition, this border opposite the Middle Horde was always much more secure than the military line along the Ural River.

Let us return now to the Little Horde, whose khan, together with [242] his brothers, seemed more devoted to Russia than Sultan Ablai.

The Little Horde had not ceased to pillage the settlements along the borders from the beginning of spring until the middle of the summer, because the Volga Kalmuks had carried off much of its livestock during the preceding winter and because the guard along the Ural prevented the Little Horde from going along the Volga to recover its losses. Perhaps this first reason was joined by a second, which was less important but could also have influenced the conduct of the guard. During the autumn of 1759, Khan Nurali had come to Orenburg with his brothers, and the governor who had replaced Nepluev treated them with scant courtesy and, what was even worse, failed to make them any presents. This irritated them to such an extent that they did not wish to take leave of him, and they steadfastly refused to comply with any of his requests.

[266 cont.]
x 648 orders to the authorities to keep [267] constant and vigorous watch upon the maintenance of justice, desiring that they grant the Kazaks every possible protection and help (1). Fourth, large

1. This wish of Empress Catherine was written in her hand, December 27, 1782 on the report from the commander of Orenburg, Lieutenant General Apukhtin.

[314] sums of money were given to build mosques on the borders of Orenburg and Siberia, to which schools and caravansaries were to be attached.

[177] By assembling all these establishments at the principal points of the border, the Empress intended not only to bring the Kazaks closer to the Russians but also to moderate their ways.

Exertions and expenditures were all in vain, for the Kazaks showed not the slightest desire to be civilized. In the [721] following year (1783) they did so much damage with their raids that it was impossible not to use armed force to punish them. Consequently, in the month of February, 1784, a detachment of 3,462 men was sent beyond the Ural River, and when they were unable to find the guilty persons, they seized 43 Kazaks who had [727] not taken any part in the last raids, in order to force them to x 648 give up the prisoners. Their kinsmen were exasperated by this 721 injustice and immediately crossed to the right bank of the Ural 726 to avenge themselves. Independently of this attack, the residents along the border were laid waste at other points by Kazaks who were not pillaging for vengeance but for the love of pillage (2). A certain Syrym Batyr stood out among them, and

2. In 1784 the Kazaks captured 176 Russians, and 175 in 1786. Who knows how many more they killed?

we will soon point him out as a man chosen to be the instrument of the most important revolutions among the Kazaks. Meanwhile

[267 cont.]
x 648 721 726 we will say that his raids and those of his partisans forced the Russians to send two [268] detachments of troops beyond the Ural. The first was composed of 2,760 men and was sent from the Ural toward the source of the Emba. The second, of 1,250 Cossacks, was sent from Uralik /Uralsk?/ toward the mouth of that same river. Snow prevented these troops from acting according to their instructions, but nevertheless the expedition was not entirely useless. They seized 213 women and children, for [727] whose ransom a large number of Russians who had been captured earlier were given up.

x 648 439 712 It will be understood that such conditions were not of a sort to make caravan trade flourish between Russia and Central Asia. For a long time the khans' promises to protect the caravans had not been believed. Long experience had made their weakness known. Nor could it be hoped to restore the brigands to reason for a long period of time. For this reason means were sought to establish the safety of trade by force of arms. It was proposed, to this end, to build forts on the Emba and Temir rivers and defenses on the route from these two points to Iletsk [Sol-Iletsk], or to set up only one fortification on Mangyshlak [Peninsula] on the Caspian Sea and to send the caravans from Guryev by sea. Thus from Orenburg to Guryev they could follow the route along the Nizhne-Uralsk line in complete safety.

One of these plans was not carried out, partly because of the extraordinary difficulties which had to be surmounted and partly because the old trade routes were very advantageous to the Khivans and Bukharans, for although the new ones would have been safer, they still would not have been entirely safe from attack.

x 648 692 The Orenburg border commission controlled matters pertaining to the Kazaks, or rather it examined all the relations of the government with this people, but it could not study the individual disputes which arose between the residents on the two sides of the line. The [269] Empress, in order to remedy this, conceived the plan of establishing a tribunal in whose operations the Kazaks would take the same part as the Russians, and which would serve them as a school of justice. This at least was what

[270 cont.]
X 648 721 had been provoked. This band was composed of 3,000 men under the command of Batyr Syrym, of whom we have already spoken. For a long time it threatened several forts on the Orenburg line, [724] and finally this daring band succeeded in winning a considerable victory at the fort of Tanalytsk and against a body of troops sent against them.

X 648 668 In 1785 a revolution began in the internal administration of the Little Horde, which is of great note to the historian and very interesting to the political scientist. The end for which it was undertaken held to the plan conceived by Catherine and her ministry to establish peace among the Kazaks. We shall describe the means by which the local authorities attained such a desirable result. Baron Igelstrom, who was then appointed to the post of governor general of Orenburg and commander of the entire Russian border from the Caspian Sea to the Tobolsk gubernia, found the Little Horde in a state of violent agitation and the borders of the [721 provinces in his care in danger. Troops of armed Kazaks riding 727] about the left bank of the Ural River caused the constant fear of an attack and kept the peasants from busying themselves with the work in the fields. And whenever they found a chance, they carried men off, pillaged, and led away the livestock. The detachment commanded by Batyr Syrym showed itself even more daring.

X 648 721 662 His attack on the fort of Tanalytsk was one of the first events which took place after the arrival of Baron Igelstrom in Orenburg. In order to take advantage of this fact, Khan Nurali hastened to inform the new governor that all the brigandage was committed by Kazaks who were defying his orders; that Syrym was not satisfied with denying his authority, but was even arousing the entire horde against him, and that in order [271] to prevent the greatest disasters, both for Russia and for the Kazaks, it was indispensable to punish the rebels by force and to remove the fomenters of disorder from the horde. The Khan concluded as before by acknowledging his weakness and requesting help to bring the bandits to their proper duties.

[276 cont.]
he was no less quick to profit from it, as he was soon presented with an opportunity to do.

Syrym's followers, as much to please him as to satisfy their own greediness, did not stop with committing offenses against Nurali in all sorts of ways, but ended by attacking villages and pillaging everything they found there. Nurali, defenseless, turned to the power of Russia and requested an armed guard from the border authorities. When he was refused, he decided to withdraw to Orenburg for a time in order to save his life, and from this city he was taken to Ufa, where he died four years later. His brother Aichuvak was detained during this time in Uralsk.

It is useless to describe the impression which these events gave to Nurali's children and the other descendants of Abulkhair. The eldest and the best known, because of his intelligence and valor, was Sultan Erali, who had had frequent relations with Russia, as we have seen. But six years before he had conquered the Karakalpaks and lived with them on the Syr [Darya] (2). He

2. Bekehurin, an interpreter of Orenburg, traveled on the Syr in 1781, and found Sultan Erali was already sovereign of the Karakalpaks.

knew perfectly well who was mainly responsible for the misfortunes of his brothers and who had caused them to lose the protection of Russia, which Abulkhair and his line had had for more than half a century. Anxious to avenge the grievances of his family, he resolved to attack Syrym and marched against him with an army which was few in number but could be counted upon. Luck smiled upon Sultan Erali on this expedition. He captured the representative of the national assembly, the title which Syrym gave himself.

At this same time other tribes of the Little Horde, who were not attached to Abulkhair's family but also did not wish to follow the incitements of Syrym or of his principal accomplices and who were accustomed, furthermore, to having khans,

[284 cont.]

successful, because the sultans, and especially the descendants of Abulkhair, were trying to please the Russian government, having been informed of the Empress' intentions to re-establish the post of khan among them. As for individual raids, Syrym's followers continued them almost without interruption for seven or eight years.

The main raids took place after the election of Sultan Erali to the position of khan, which was in 1791 by order of the Empress. When she learned of Nurali's death, she commanded on January 29 that Erali be named his successor and that he be sent the patent of khan of the Little Horde without waiting for any representations. In carrying out the will of his sovereign, the commander of the province of Orenburg at once informed Abulkhair's son of the honor which was being given him and invited him to appear at the border at the end of summer to receive the ceremonial investiture. Erali arrived at the Ural at the designated time with his followers and on September 4 was proclaimed khan, 15 versts from the fortress of Orsk.

This is how his election took place. On the day at the hour designated, Lieutenant General Peutling, supreme commander of [285] the border region of Orenburg, escorted by a body of troops appeared before the assembled Kazaks and commanded first of all that the imperial document be read to them, in which it was said that Erali had been designated khan, both because of his personal merit and because he was the eldest in Abulkhair's family. Then he invited the people to proceed to the election according to its old customs.

At this same moment there appeared the deputies of Batyr Syrym, those of Sultan Abulgazy Kaip, and those of several elders, who announced that they did not consent to the election of Erali. They received the reply that he had been designated by the wish of the Empress. The next day, after the proclamation of the Khan, that is, September 5, six deputies were chosen who were sent to St. Petersburg to ask that he be confirmed.

On September 6 a letter was received from the khan of Turkestan, Pirali, son of Nurali, in which this prince, who had

[286 cont.]
x 648 668 662 that Erali's election was illegal, claiming that Baron Igelstrom had concluded an agreement with the Little Horde by which he had promised, in the name of the government, to remove the descendants of Abulkhair forever from the position of khan. Using every possible weapon against Russia, he did not forget to call the Koran to his aid, pointing out that it is forbidden to Moslems [688] to submit themselves to Christian powers. To this same end he sought, in 1791, to induce the Kazaks to end their barter with the Russians and, if possible, to withdraw into the interior of the steppes. He spread the rumor that he was expecting the Bukharan army which the khan of that country had promised him. He sent his son to Khiva in 1793 to ask for similar aid, and although he received a flat refusal, he boasted nevertheless of the success of the embassy. In 1792 he addressed an extremely insolent letter to Peutling, chief of the viceroyalty of Ufa, in which it was not enough to insult him by the most coarse expressions, but the Empress was attacked as well. Finally, in his [721 rage, he solemnly declared war against Russia. The results of this 726] declaration were several new raids by bandits, made by Syrym upon Ilezkoi [Iletski] Gorodok [now Ilek], Fort Kalmuk, and various other places on the Iletsk line.

x 648 Khan Erali could not make his enemy see reason, and therefore in 1792 he demanded that troops be sent to the horde to punish the offenders. The Empress did not grant this request. Rightly contemptuous of Syrym's malicious intentions, she [287] did not wish to spill the blood of the Kazaks, especially since the severe defeat they had suffered in 1790 in the midst of their steppes at the hands of the Ural Cossacks had in no way corresponded to her humanitarian intentions nor to the expectations of the ministry.

In the midst of the disturbances which were then troubling the Little Horde, we should note Erali's request for a house to be built for him near the fort of Orsk and the request of Sultan Ishim for the construction of a city in the midst of the steppes. Circumstances did not permit the satisfaction of this last demand at that time, but Erali's request would have been granted if he had not died in the month of June, 1794, after ruling the Little Horde for three years.

[288 cont.]

X 648 [673] 1795, his partisans assembled by invitation near Orenburg, and on September 17 he was elected and proclaimed khan. They then swore on the Koran to live in peace with each other and not to disturb the Russian border.

X 648 681 Ishim's elevation did not diminish his attachment to the power which had given him a new title. After he became khan he did not cease to carry out the wishes of the Russian government as much as possible, against the wishes of his people, and this caused him to have many enemies. In order to avert the dangers which threatened him because of the severity with which he investigated the crimes as well the intrigues of Syrym and his followers, Empress Catherine decided to send him a detachment of troops to guard him and at the same time to help him carry out sentences against the offenders.

Y 648 685 It was also decided to establish a divan or council of the khan around him to support him in the administration of the Little Horde. The members of this divan, chosen by the people from among the most distinguished sultans and elders, were to carry out the wishes of the Khan, to help him, to represent him, and to [289] live with him in houses which were ordered to be built for them in the steppes in the territory of Taissugan.

X 648 [669] These plans could not be carried out because Syrym Batyr attacked Ishim in November, 1797 near the fortified post of Krasny Yar [Krasnoiar] and, after causing him to perish cruelly, pillaged all his belongings.

This crime of Syrym's exhausted the patience of the government, but how and where was he to be punished, much less brought into Russia? No doubt it was possible to send troops against him, but the difficulty of looking for him, the maintenance of the troops beyond the borders, the loss of men from hunger and thirst, even the destruction of Syrym's followers still did not assure the success of the pursuit they might undertake. Thus we should not be astonished that this famous brigand evaded punishment for all his attacks against Russia.

● [726] However, all the Kazaks who followed his example and pillaged the borders at that time did not remain without punishment.

[289 cont.]
During the winter of 1797-98, a strong detachment of Ural Cossacks crossed the Ural River and not only defeated the robbers but in exchange for the studs which had been taken from them in Russia, they carried off several thousands of horses, which were distributed to those who had suffered losses. Shortly afterward they were attacked by the Bashkirs, who took 5,000 horses from them.

It can be imagined that the Kazaks did not leave these two losses unavenged. The result was new raids, new reprisals, and new insults from one side and the other. In order to put an end to these disturbances, commissions were established on the borders composed of deputies of the Bashkir, Kazak, and Kalmuk peoples, as well as the Ural and Orenburg Cossacks. These commissions were supposed to examine the complaints which came to them from all sides and to satisfy them as much as possible, as well as to try to suppress permanently demands which were unjust or impossible to satisfy.

[290] These commissions did not fulfill the object of their meeting, and indeed scarcely set about satisfying the duties imposed on them, for no one appeared at the tribunal.

At this time many Kazaks from different hordes asked to establish themselves permanently in Russia. Their requests were answered in an ukase of September 30, 1797, as a consequence of which 12,000 tents of the Middle Horde alone are settled down in various localities to this day.

After Ishim's death the government of the Little Horde was entrusted to a council composed of Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair, as president, and six councilors, two from each tribe. They were all chosen by Baron Igelstrom, who was then commanding the Orenburg border area for the second time and had once again given the government the idea of maintaining the Kazaks without the intermediary of a khan. When Emperor Paul had sent a confirmation of his demands, he chose the Khobda River as the permanent residence of the council and had it opened in this region by the mufti Mohammed Djan Hussein, who was sent from Orenburg in 1797. The councilors took an oath of loyalty and swore to carry out their duties zealously, and the mufti remained with them

Kazakhs in one horde under one political government had not been realized since the 15th century, except for a brief adventure in unification by Khan Tiavka at the end of the 17th century. 668

The term Alash recalls even more ancient days, for it refers to the mythical founder of all Kazakhdom, the ancestor of all Kazakhs, Alash, or Alach. The figure of Alash is not a fiction; he lived in the era of the emperor Tamerlane, near the end of the 14th century. According to the tale recorded in the 19th century of the origin of the Kazakh people, the descendants of Alash divided into three hordes, which in turn formed the basis for the social organization which existed on the eve of the Russian conquest.[1] "Alash" became first a Kazakh battle cry, evoking the name of their glorious ancestry, and finally the name of their first political party. [973] [926]

During the 1920's those leaders of the Alash-Orda who were not purged were gradually absorbed into the Soviet Party and civil life; some of them, Tynyshpaev, Baitursunov, and Bukeikhanov, became active journalists and scholars under the Soviets. They continued to "glorify" the Kazakh past, and were roundly denounced for this by Soviet propagandists. The issue which aroused Soviet disapproval was their representation of the Kazakh community as a sort of idyllic, primitive communism, in which each man helped his neighbor, rich and poor sharing alike. This doctrine was inacceptable to the Soviets of the 1930's, for the line had now become that the Kazakh village was torn with class strife between exploiter and exploited. In the course of this controversy, the old Alash-Orda leaders were purged and liquidated, in a severe struggle which was still going on as late as 1934.[2] 648 668 [304]

There were companion movements to the Alash-Ordists of Kazakhstan among other people of Central Asia. At the time of the Russian Revolution the political development among the Turks of southern Turkestan and the Caucasus bore the name of Basmachi, while that among the Turks of the southern Urals was known as the Bashkurd (the Bashkir name for themselves); among the Tartars of the Volga region the movement was called the Idil-Ural (Idil or Itil or Idel is an old Turkic name for the Volga River), and a similar movement in Uzbekistan and neighboring areas was known as the Djadid. Some of these movements were markedly and avowedly oriented toward foreign sources.

The Basmachi, for example, geographically close to Turkey, had a strong pro-Turkish orientation, or rather, it endorsed Pan-Turanianism more strongly than the other movements, and this brought it closer to the Turks of Turkey. The Pan-Turanian movement advocates the political unification of all Turks under one state and government, which would stretch from China to European Turkey and the Balkans; it involves open propaganda for separation of Turkestan from Russia. This doctrine is therefore a sensitive subject in Moscow, and the cause of some tension. It was and is a far more dangerous threat than was the Alash-Orda; the strongest Soviet denunciation of the Alash-Ordists is that they were connected with Pan-Turanianism through the Basmachi. Actually, there

[1] Velikhanov, 1904, pp. 289-300.
[2] For a summary, see Tagabaev, 1934, passim.

69 Again, each clan had a war cry, or uran, whereby it iden-
[726] tified itself in battle, at great gatherings, and so forth. Such an uran was the name of the clan ancestor, and thus evoked the glory of the clan, intensifying the feeling of membership in the tradition of him who raised the cry.[77] The relation of the clan to principles of exogamy will be discussed below in a more general treatment of the rules of marriage.

63 The lineage in the Great Horde, as elsewhere among the Kazakhs, is a corporate structure, but does not fulfill the criteria for the corporation[1] as closely as do the clan or the extended family. Thus, it lacks the firm locus of authority possessed by other social units of an analogical corporate type; moreover, its "charter" is derivative of the clan charter--the genealogy. Nevertheless, it was during the 19th century a more active social unit than the clan, since the latter was moribund, and it entered more intimately into the every-day life of the Kazakhs. The lineage was a unit of varying scope, by which is meant two things: first, the actual composition in living members; second, the number of generations

[77] Izraztsov, 27. Cf. Balliuzek, 164: "For the distinction of each of his friends under attack by foreign clans, to give him courage in attacking the enemy,... to invoke aid...there is a special signal called uran and consisting of the names of the clan ancestor or of later distinguished ancestors...." The English "hurrah!" is a derivation of the term uran.

[1] [cf. cat. 116, AHI Mongolia, p. 389, for these criteria--Analyst]